INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT POLICY FOR WOMEN AND YOUTH

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Foreword

This paper has been produced for IVCO 2018, the International Volunteer Cooperation Organisations’ Conference. It is one of a series of papers exploring this year’s conference theme ‘Women and youth: bridging the gap – volunteering for inclusive development’.

A Framing Paper provides an introduction and overview:

- Inclusive development for women and youth: where are we at?

Three Theme Papers address specific topics:

1. Inclusive development policy for women and youth (this paper)
2. Inclusive development practice for women
3. Inclusive development practice for youth.

Note on terminology: These papers use the terms volunteer involving organisations (VIOs) and international volunteer cooperation organisations (IVCOs). IVCOs should be understood as a specific group or type of VIO.

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Introduction

Over the past decade, several Western governments have adopted foreign policies that aim to foster greater inclusion and empowerment of women and youth. With its new Feminist International Assistance Policy, Canada, for instance, joins Sweden and Norway in moving beyond gender mainstreaming to espouse an explicitly feminist framework (Government of Canada 2017). Many international volunteer cooperation organisations (IVCOs) welcome this new focus, as it aligns with their long history of championing the needs and rights of women and girls.

For many development actors, including IVCOs, this represents a departure from how bilateral funds have traditionally been attributed, as program logics and selection criteria increasingly favour projects that are expected to have a transformative impact on women and vulnerable populations. However, the management mechanisms that are mobilised to deliver these projects remain largely unchanged – that is, they are top-down and heavily driven by accountability to donors. Indeed, donors’ favoured management approach, results-based management, has become universally accepted among development actors, despite a lack of evidence for superior performance (Bornstein et al. 2007, Wallace 2004, Hatton & Schroeder 2007, Simpson & Gill 2007, Girei 2015, Golini et al. 2017). This testifies to the ubiquity of Western managerialist principles and the dominance of donors’ agendas (Lough & Allum 2013, Baillie Smith & Laurie 2001, Georgeou & Engel 2011, Schech et al. 2015). Meanwhile, the increasing homogenisation of management approaches that is occurring, spreading from the West to the South, threatens the diversity and autonomy that are essential to building strong civil societies.

Policies that speak of inclusion, which are operationalised through management mechanisms, must extend beyond tokenistic participation and reconsider the impact of imposing Western ideologies and management standards on Southern constituents. This paper argues that inclusion of vulnerable populations can be more than the desired outcome of development interventions. Rather, it is both a means to an end, and an end in itself. This paper contends that feminist or youth-inclusive policies must also be reflected in global inclusive management approaches. Concretely, this may mean that IVCOs and development actors need to reverse the trend of compliance with donor-driven Western management paradigms by welcoming and advocating for a rich diversity of approaches that emanate from the South.

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1 The terms ‘Western’, ‘West’, ‘Northern’ and ‘North’ in this text do not denote a homogeneous set of values, nor do they point to a specific geographic area. Rather, they are used to refer broadly to ideologies that have been inherited from Europe.

2 It is argued that young people’s participation is often symbolic and remains limited because of the failure of organisations and governments to address the power mechanisms of policy agendas that have contributed to marginalisation (Hart 2008).
One critical question is how IVCOs can expect to empower marginalised groups when they themselves are subject to top-down managerial control exerted by donor agencies. A solution might lie in their ability to use their privileged position to champion more inclusive management approaches – thus bridging the gap between policy and implementation. IVCOs, having long been considered valuable partners in development by donor agencies because of the proximity of their activities to Southern communities, are uniquely positioned to advocate for more participatory approaches and greater diversity in management practices. Southern-based organisations working with volunteers create ‘policy space’ where mainstream discourses are challenged through joint knowledge creation, communication and trust (Schech et al. 2015). IVCOs are located at the intersection between donors and Southern constituents, which means that they are well placed to explore and test Southern-driven delivery approaches and amplify the existing management practices of women and youth. This paper challenges IVCOs to consider how they can foster such ‘policy space’ that can lead to the emergence of feminist, youth-centered and inclusive management to complement the policies of donors.

The text is structured as follows: the first section presents a high-level overview of the policy context, while the second section discusses policy delivery mechanisms in Western countries. The third section addresses the misalignment between inclusive policy and inclusive implementation, and the final section considers the role and contribution of IVCOs.

**Overview of the policy environment for inclusive development**

Very recently, several member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) have put forward international assistance policies that feature an explicit feminist orientation, focusing on gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls as the most effective means of addressing inclusion, poverty and inequality. The majority of bilateral agencies—see for instance Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI), the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the United States’ Agency for International Development (USAID)—have long-standing commitments to integrate gender into their development strategies, usually manifested by the twin-track strategy of gender mainstreaming combined with dedicated gender equality initiatives. Most bilateral donors have also made commitments related to the United Nations’ Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which stresses the importance of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, and in peace negotiations and humanitarian response (OECD 2017).³

In October 2014, Sweden was the first country to launch a feminist foreign policy that features six thematic areas to achieve gender equality.\(^4\) Norway’s 2016-2020 Action Plan for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in Foreign and Development Policy outlines five similar priority areas.\(^5\) Joining the ranks of these gender equality leaders, Canada announced in 2017 its new feminist international assistance policy that includes several subprograms that target women’s leadership and the needs of Southern organisations working to advance the rights of women and girls (see Box 1). Canada’s efforts are consistent with those of Norway and Sweden, but they are presented as a ‘stepping up’ of commitments that draw on evidence-based decision-making and comprehensive data collection on gender equality. They are supported by important investments and explicit targets, which, by adding an accountability dimension to the policy, limit the risk that it will be reduced to tokenistic rhetoric.\(^6\)

### Box 1: Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy

Based on the premise that empowering women and girls is the most effective way to target the root causes of poverty, inequality and exclusion, Canada’s new feminist policy features a stand-alone core that focuses on achieving gender equality. It includes commitments to combat sexual and gender-based violence, to improve public sector institutional capacity to deliver programs and policies that favour gender equality, and to promote research, data collection, gender analysis and evaluation. The policy features several priority strategies, including:

- promoting human dignity
- fostering growth that works for everyone
- promoting women’s leadership and economic opportunities within climate action
- supporting inclusive governance
- fostering global peace and security by supporting the participation of women in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction
- combating systemic discrimination and engaging men and boys
- relying on clear data and accountabilities.

(Government of Canada 2017)

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4 The six themes are: the enjoyment of human rights by all women and girls globally; freedom from gender-based violence; the participation of women in peace-building efforts; political participation; economic empowerment (which includes girls’ education and women’s employment); and sexual and reproductive health (Sweden Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2017).

5 Namely: inclusive and equitable quality education for all girls and boys; women’s equal participation in political life; full economic rights for women and equal opportunities for women to participate in the labour market; the elimination of violence and harmful practices against women and girls; and sexual and reproductive health and rights for girls and women (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016).

6 Concretely, this means that in addition to a significant pledge of $150 million Canadian dollars to support local women’s rights organisations, 15% of government bilateral assistance will explicitly target transformative gender programming (up from 2%) while 95% of the country’s bilateral assistance will be earmarked to support the objectives of the policy (Government of Canada 2017).
Meanwhile, several governments have renewed their focus on youth volunteering since 2000, as evidenced, for example, by the regeneration of Fredskopset Norway, the development of the German Government's Weltwärts program, and the UK's International Citizen Service (ICS) program, all of which have resulted in the repositioning of youth at the centre of the volunteering for development agenda. DFID's youth policy, published in 2016, also represents a step forward, in that it positions youth as drivers of their own development, rather than youth as a focus of development. DFID country offices are expected to have youth panels, consider employing young people on graduate and internship schemes, and develop a youth strategy (DFID 2016). This, however, does not suggest radical change in the way in which DFID works. 'While some formal spaces have been carved out for young people', notes an Oxfam Novib study, 'they still experience relatively little decision-making power and influence over national or local priorities' (Bacalso & Hao 2017, p.4). While the greater commitments to youth empowerment are noticeable, the tangible changes in everyday donor modes of practice are harder to crystallise.

IVCOs, which are accustomed to collaborating with Southern civil society organisations and are long-standing champions of youth-led development, women’s rights and inclusive development approaches, welcome this type of policy shift with enthusiasm. However, while the above-mentioned governments make strong cases for investing in feminist and youth programming, they do not provide a comprehensive plan of action for rolling out new policies through collaboration with various stakeholders, including IVCOs.

Western development policy and its management rationale

Without disputing the validity of gender mainstreaming and youth inclusion, some critics argue that feminist policies such as those of Canada, Sweden or Norway simply represent new incarnations of a Western development agenda, far removed from the truly inclusive framework that it purports to be. As early as 2001, Cooke and Kothari were likewise warning that the discourse of participation represented little more than a new donor-driven agenda, with limited impact on empowerment because it remained ‘imposed’ on Southern constituents (Cooke & Kothari 2001). Clearly, this poses a significant challenge for donors and development actors alike, which may in part be explained by the legacy of public management reforms.

7 ‘For Agenda 2030 to be successfully realised, young people must be at the heart of implementing, monitoring and evaluating the Global Goals – without the full participation of young people we will not achieve sustainable development’ (DFID 2016, p.3).

8 In Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy, for instance, support for the Istanbul Civil Society Organisations’ Development Effectiveness Principles remains vague. The policy is silent about how, concretely, it focuses on people’s empowerment, democratic ownership and participation. According to the Istanbul Principles, civil society organisations are ‘effective as development actors when they support the empowerment and inclusive participation of people to expand their democratic ownership over policies and development initiatives that affect their lives, with an emphasis on the poor and marginalised’ (Open Forum for CSO Effectiveness 2010, p.1).
The way in which donor policy is implemented today can be traced back to the neoliberal reforms that swept across the West in the 1980s, along with the accompanying management archetype, loosely known as New Public Management (NPM). Still unambiguously considered as a superior model for policy implementation, NPM calls for greater emphasis on output controls, with resource allocation and rewards being linked to measurable performance (Savoie 1995, Denhardt & Denhardt 2011). As a result of the widespread adoption of NPM to oversee publicly-funded initiatives, IVCOs today are well-versed in its emblematic vocabulary: logframes, performance measures, targets, baselines, inputs, outputs and indicators have entered the vernacular of Western and Southern organisations alike.9

Drawing from NPM and aid effectiveness rationality, the international donor community created and now actively applies a set of performance metrics, which it utilises to evaluate the need for assistance and the allocation of aid. Those same metrics serve to evaluate progress towards the achievement of the ideal developed state, which in turn is modeled according to the values of the industrialised nations of the West. Today, IVCOs and their NGO collaborators in the South are well aware that the flow of money is typically accompanied by a spate of standardised requirements, including environmental sustainability, gender equality, youth inclusion and governance (Girei 2015, Bornstein 2003, Hatton & Schroeder 2007). It is this form of managerialism – which accompanies any new government policy, be it youth-centered or feminist – that prevents the meaningful participation of Southern constituents. It also obfuscates the wealth of locally owned and culturally coherent management approaches that can, if allowed to flourish, lead to a vibrant and emancipated civil society.

A mismatch between policy delivery and inclusive management

Irrespective of its focus on women or youth, the current international assistance delivery approach favoured by donors relies on structure and control throughout the project cycle to conceive, plan, implement, monitor and evaluate projects and programs. Accountability is a prominent feature in this system, with tools designed to report upwards to demonstrate outcomes to those providing the funding (Jacobs 2010). It can be argued that the dominant management approach, despite the rhetoric of participation, is not intended to be inclusive of diverse management perspectives. The financial precarity of many organisations does not lend itself well to risk-taking, and the dominant management technology does not come with the required flexibility, responsiveness and participatory framework for including the voices of marginalised women and youth.

While the political environment may evolve to take on feminist orientations and a greater

9 The historical context is briefly outlined in Annex 2.
focus on inclusion, a growing body of research shows, however, that the accountability mechanisms that accompany development policy consistently undermine Southern constituents’ participation and ownership.\(^{10}\)

**Stepping aside, and the role of IVCOs as champions of inclusion to reduce the implementation gap**

IVCOs are privileged to work with a range of very diverse local stakeholders to identify and address pressing problems. The volunteering for development model fosters long-term trusting relationships and dialogue which are arguably crucial to developing in-depth understanding of local realities and bottom-up, adaptive development solutions. This is especially true of long-term mandates, which allow volunteers and their counterparts in host organisations to achieve greater embeddedness and to overcome power dynamics that are inherent in North-South relationships (Devereux 2008, Schech et al. 2015, McWha 2001, Lough & Carter-Black 2015, Impey & Overton 2014). Proximity to stakeholders, which cannot be achieved by bilateral donors, provides rich insight for IVCOs – informed by their collaborators – into the various forms of marginalisation that perpetuate disenfranchisement. As such, VIOs are attuned to the power dynamics that contribute to exclusion, and thus uniquely positioned to advocate for inclusive development.\(^{11}\)

There are many ways, then, that IVCOs can help bridge the implementation gap for inclusive policies. Research undertaken by the OECD (2017) highlighted that progress can be made by donors (and via IVCOs) to value qualitative evaluations and case studies that are rich in context-specific analysis and information about families and communities. This type of data collection, which can be done over video by local facilitators, also fosters greater learning between IVCOs and their partners, in addition to featuring stakeholders as having agency rather than simply being recipients of aid. This would require, for some organisations, a shift away from rigid planning tools (which contain the bare minimum of gender-disaggregated data) and into more complex and locally-driven data collection,

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10 It can be argued the tools used for reporting to donors – the logframe, project plans, indicators, impact assessments – while they purport to be participatory, in fact represent a top-down managerialist approach that disadvantages and excludes local constituents from the project cycle. Furthermore, an evaluation of donor practices conducted by the OECD revealed that there is limited evidence of reflection about causal assumptions in gender-programming frameworks – the theories of change being mostly donor-driven as opposed to devised by the targeted constituents. The study also noted that monitoring tended to be used for administrative accountability purposes, to show how funds were being spent, rather than for adaptive learning aimed at improving program performance and accountability to Southern communities (OECD 2017).

11 The acknowledgement of the importance of marginalised and vulnerable youth having a voice poses an interesting challenge to IVCOs – how to address issues of diversity and inclusion in the modes of volunteer recruitment. Donors may impose restrictions so that volunteers are drawn from different parts of society – as does DFID in relation to the UK volunteers on the ICS program. If the objectives of the program are primarily experiential for the volunteers themselves; but where donors expect development outcomes, is this consistent with a policy that determines volunteer characteristics? If there is to be a genuine commitment to leaving no-one behind, how do the ‘powerful actors’ change to support an enabling environment for and visibility of young volunteers?
research and analysis. Mindfully contracting local evaluators and researchers would have the potential advantage of data being owned and analysed by the beneficiaries rather than by foreigners. It could require the systematisation of learning activities, in which Southern constituents are able to share their insights on the complexity of transforming structural causes of gender inequality or youth exclusion in their local context. For IVCOs, this would translate into frequent and reflexive adaptation of program management tools, rather than reliance on predetermined logical frameworks. Given that social change is not a linear process and is rather about shifting underlying attitudes and norms, mixed evaluation methods would be more appropriate to capture progress, rather than reporting on quantitative outputs. IVCOs can collectively challenge donors to review their performance frameworks to include a greater diversity of data collection mechanisms, and flexible timelines to account for the long-term relationships that need to be fostered through volunteering, all of which could be accompanied by funding for local actors – women and youth – to conduct research.

Furthermore, management of development interventions can be made more inclusive and empowering by having Southern constituents devise their own theory of change, thus ensuring that the causal relationships identified are reflective of local ideologies, norms and processes. To foster greater autonomy, more core funding could be provided to Southern constituents instead of unpredictable project-based funding, as retrospective activity-based accounting diverts organisations’ attention towards short-term project implementation and upward accountability requirements. Implementation of inclusive policies therefore needs to include the establishment of norms that provide increased capacity for direct funding, and additional leeway for both Southern CSOs and IVCOs to respond to diverse and emergent needs.\textsuperscript{12} Allowing Southern constituents to hold individual volunteers, IVCOs and donors accountable for meaningfully enacting the participation and ownership values of the Paris Declaration or the Istanbul Principles would contribute to redressing the power asymmetries that currently characterise NGO-donor relations.

\textsuperscript{12} Along those lines, the Canadian government’s new fund for small and medium-sized women’s rights organisations in Canada and abroad is a welcome start.
Conclusion

This paper has suggested that feminist and youth policies are lacking in terms of implementation, relying as they do on orthodox NPM and results-based management approaches. Because of its rigidity and its orientation towards upward accountability, the dominant approach to managing development may not yield the desired results of new feminist or youth-centered policy. Accountability and vulnerability in a resource-poor environment may lead Southern constituents to comply with Western agendas, at the expense of developing a vibrant and emancipated Southern development sector. It is for this reason that the most radical critics advocate for the dissolution of aid planning architectures, to enable the flourishing of indigenous knowledge as the only trajectory for sovereign development (Cooke 2004, Kerr 2008). However, such a drastic option might itself yield questionable results on inclusion of women and youth. Instead, IVCOs can lead the search, with their person-to-person, community-focused approach, for complementary delivery approaches and tools that contribute to the redistribution of power and foster increased downward accountability.

As donors have already recognised through their continued support to IVCOs globally, governments cannot implement these changes alone. True shifts in policy require more than earmarked funding, but rather a comprehensive and integrated multi-stakeholder approach that places Southern NGOs in the driver’s seat. By loosening the ties of prescriptive management, IVCOs can effectively step aside and learn from their Southern collaborators, reversing the counterproductive trend that perpetuates power asymmetries between the West and the South.

Key Questions

1. What is the scope for donors changing their approach away from upward accountability and management practices to enable genuine engagement of women and youth in their own development?

2. Are there opportunities provided by the focus of the SDGs on people holding national governments to account while ‘leaving no-one behind’?

3. To what extent can IVCOs change their ways of working to make downward accountability go beyond the rhetoric of ‘involving’ women and youth?

4. What are the key ways in which IVCOs need to change their ways of working to reduce barriers to youth and women’s empowerment?
Annex 1: VSO commitments to engaging youth in its organisation and programming

VSO’s commitments

VSO and its partners are fully committed to:

- Delivering ‘adaptive programming’ by, with and for young people across our core program areas with a pledge to explore varied youth volunteering models.

- Building young people’s assets and capabilities so that they have the resources, skills and knowledge needed to thrive, engage and bring about lasting positive changes.

- Strengthening the capacity of our staff, partners and other stakeholders in how to work effectively with young people and youth volunteers.

- Documenting the lessons learned from our youth work and using these internally to keep improving our policy and practice, as well as sharing them externally to shape the sector.

- Expanding youth-led research and monitoring, including exploring young people’s contribution to the SDGs.

- Nurturing and supporting young people meaningfully within our internal systems and processes in VSO’s programs, while stepping up our investment in youth leadership.

VSO Kenya Program

As a result of a youth-led program with deaf youth in 2017, the below changed in VSO Kenya management and programs:

- About 10 staff members have learned basic sign language skills to interact with deaf people. Sign language classes for staff and volunteers were led by one of the deaf alumni.

- VSO Kenya developed visual assessment tools for the deaf, in consultation with deaf youth and partners working with the deaf.
Subsequently VSO Kenya recruited a pool of qualified interpreters who are engaged in assessments, training, and national community forums and dialogues to ensure that the deaf are fully integrated and meaningfully engaged.

A number of alumni have been trained by VSO Kenya as social inclusion facilitators, selectors and researchers to enhance youth voice in programming.

Based on VSO Kenya’s youth context analysis and social inclusion and gender analysis, one of the core target groups for the youth program are the deaf youth.

VSO Kenya has initiated integrated youth volunteering projects that include both hearing and deaf volunteers.

Source: VSO (no date) Unlocking the Potential of Youth. Special thanks to Alok Rath for the unpublished data in this section.
Annex 2: Historical background on foreign aid policy and delivery mechanisms

International aid as we know it today can be traced back to the post-WW2 era, a historical period that is marked by the breakdown of the colonial system, the advance of communism in parts of the world and the resulting fear in capitalist countries, the decimation of European economies due to the war, vast gains in productive capacity in the United States and growing faith in science and technology. Economic and political currents of the era gave rise to the establishment of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1944, known collectively as the Bretton Woods Institutions. Preceding the Marshall Plan by a few years, the World Bank and the IMF were established to reinvigorate the postwar economy among allied countries through international economic cooperation. Bretton Woods funds were eventually extended to newly independent nations in Africa, Latin America and Asia in the form of loans to support infrastructure and productive industry projects (Escobar 1988, Murphy 2008). Thus emerged the contemporary discourse that places the First World in the role of benefactor to the seemingly underdeveloped economies of nascent Third World nations. This position was further institutionalised in subsequent decades by the creation, in many OECD countries, of government departments devoted exclusively to the implementation of publicly-funded international development programs. Volunteer-sending also emerged, around this same time, as a mechanism favoured by donors to achieve poverty reduction and development (Schech 2017, Baillie Smith & Laurie 2011). Today, it remains central in UN strategies to complement the action of governments in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): ‘Volunteerism increases the reach and inclusivity of action, it allows to scale initiatives from the local to the national level and beyond, it builds capacities and ownerships and connects local communities to local and national authorities with the potential to develop more robust public-private partnerships’ (UNV 2016, p.5).

The early eighties, however, marked an abrupt rightward turn in domestic policies that impacted on IVCOs, shifting the focus away from government-led development interventions and onto market integration as the primary mechanism of poverty alleviation. The move away from state-led approaches and towards privatisation and economic liberalisation spilled over into international policy and aid in the form of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which represented the growing uniformity of development thinking and policy. Championed by the Bretton Woods institutions, SAPs imposed increasingly stringent loan conditions upon more than one hundred recipient countries,

13 For example: USAID, AusAID (now Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – DFAT) and CIDA (now Global Affairs Canada).
forcing government restructuring and privatisation of social services. Downsizing the state apparatus and reducing its role to that of enabler and regulator, rather than a provider and producer of services, created a void that was filled by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in both the North and the South. In accordance with neoliberal thinking, donor agencies took to contracting development initiatives to Southern NGOs via intermediary NGOs in the North, establishing what is now known as the aid chain (Bornstein et al. 2007). Private sector business logic, favoured by neoliberal champions, resulted in increased professionalisation of volunteers and development actors and the global spread of managerialism (Vodopivec & Jaffe 2011, Baillie Smith & Laurie 2011, Lough & Allum 2013, Schech 2017, Georgeou & Engel 2011).

Box 2: The influence of neoliberal policy and corporate sector values on management
Managerialism can be broadly defined as an understanding of management as comprised of neutral techniques or processes to achieve good administration, which is defined in terms of efficiency. In the development industry, managerialism equates to acceptance of corporate management discourse in all geographic contexts and spheres, including at the community level where interventions are delivered. The prevalence of corporate ideology and its widespread yet uncritical application in the field of development derives its power from a Western-biased belief in its universal applicability (Mowles 2010, Gulrajani 2011). This is unfounded at best, and pernicious at worst in that it perpetuates the power asymmetries between donor and aid recipient countries.

Increased scrutiny by donors and the public, brought about by the partial success of several decades’ worth of poverty-reduction initiatives, led to the production of the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness in 2005, a development roadmap that fostered a significant culture shift in donor policy and implementation. Today, more than a decade later, the Paris Declaration and its subsequent iterations, the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011) retain a paramount status in defining development management throughout the world. The ‘development standard’ to achieve includes good governance, environmental sustainability and gender equality, as reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals and the feminist international assistance policies of countries such as Canada, Norway and Sweden.
Box 3: From the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation

Produced by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, The Paris Declaration laid out various prescriptions intended to enhance the management and delivery of international aid, namely: ownership (whereby recipient countries exert control and leadership over the establishment of aid priorities and the implementation of initiatives); alignment (donors supporting recipient countries’ pre-existing strategies); harmonisation (donors coordinating interventions among themselves to reduce fragmentation of efforts and transaction costs); managing for results (adhering to results-based management and the corresponding tool-kits) and mutual accountability (shared commitment between donor and recipient for the implementation of initiatives and delivery of results) (OECD 2005). Today the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, which emerged from the Fourth High-level Forum on Aid Effectiveness that took place in Busan, South Korea, is a ‘multi-stakeholder platform to advance the effectiveness of development efforts by all actors, to deliver results that are long-lasting and contribute to the achievements of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)’ (UN n.d., p.1). The GPEDC features four shared principles of development cooperation that were agreed upon in 2011 by over 160 countries, known as the Busan principles. These principles are: ownership of development priorities by developing countries; focus on results; inclusive development partnerships; and transparency and accountability to each other.
Annex 3: Oxfam guidance on good practice for youth engagement

In 2017 Oxfam published a review of key frameworks and strategies on youth engagement in policy-making used by national, international and inter-governmental agencies. Its ‘key reflections’ can be understood as an articulation of the components that contribute to good practice.

Box 3: Eight key reflections for youth engagement

- Youth as partners and leaders in change and accountability
- When youth influence organisational policies it can build immediately their skills and experience to influence public policies
- Ensuring internal empowerment and an enabling environment
- Connecting with each other, exchanging ideas, and working collaboratively in networks allows different stakeholders to find innovative solutions to shared problems
- Supporting both individual and collective youth action
- The challenge of informality
- Ensuring representation of young people in all their heterogeneity
- Understanding and measuring the impacts of youth participation

(Bacalso & Hao 2017).

‘Youth participation cannot be an end in and of itself, where youth active citizenship is the only goal. Rather, youth participation is a means to achieve social change. The development community too often focuses on youth empowerment alone, and not on how they can help to support the societal change that young people seek’ (Bacalso & Hao 2017, p.16).
Annex 4: Women- and youth-inclusive management: suggested questions for the reflexive practitioner

1. How are women and youth involved in selecting project priorities and defining their needs?
2. Have we asked women and youth to explain their own theory of change – one that is relevant to their context – or does the IVCO have one overarching theory of change?
3. When diagnosing capacity-building needs, have women and youth identified the capacities they themselves wish to develop, and the standards they wish to achieve?
4. Have women and youth determined how they want to evaluate their capacity, or has a diagnostic tool with predetermined performance categories been suggested by the IVCO?
5. How are women and youth involved in designing the project, selecting project constituents and desired outcomes?
6. How are women and youth involved in designing the volunteer mandates and in selecting volunteers?
7. How are women and youth involved in training and supporting volunteers?
8. Who designs the overall project budget, and what portion is retained by the IVCO?
9. How much of the budget (if any) represents core funding for Southern partner organisations?
10. Have women and youth designed the intervention and strategy according to their own causal logic (which may differ from Western causal logic)?
11. How have women and youth constituents been involved in defining how the project will be managed, and by whom?
12. Who has selected the management tools that will be used?
13. Is a reporting format (narrative and/or financial) imposed by the IVCO, or proposed by women and youth constituents?
14. How have we integrated the partners’ pre-existing management tools into our own management approach?
15. Have we planned formal activities in which the partner is instructing us in how they manage their projects?
16. Have women and youth agreed to performance monitoring, and if so, have they designed the performance monitoring framework? How much of the data collection is qualitative?
17. Have they identified the indicators to be utilised for evaluating performance?
18. Will they themselves be leading the evaluation process or will it be externally driven?
19. Will structured learning opportunities result from this process in which insight from the partner is integrated into the IVCO’s overall strategy?
20. Will this strategy be shared or co-constructed with the constituents?
21. How comfortable is the IVCO or practitioner with relinquishing management control in favour of more meaningful ownership of the project by Southern constituents?
Bibliography


